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Abstract
Population dynamics are often subject to random independent changes in the environment. For
the two strategy stochastic replicator dynamic, we assume that stochastic changes in the environment
replace the payoffs and variance. This is modeled by a continuous time Markov chain in a finite atom
space. We establish conditions for this dynamic to have an analogous characterization of the long-run
behavior to that of the deterministic dynamic. To create intuition, we first consider the case when the
Markov chain has two states. A very natural extension to the general finite state space of the Markov
chain will be given.
Keywords: Replicator dynamic; Markovian switching; Lyapunov function; Stochastic process; Stochas-
tic stability
1 Introduction
Stochastic environments where independent external forces change the dynamic of the system are common
in biological and economic settings [23, 14, 5, 19, 6, 13, 29, 15, 10, 22, 1]. An example to illustrate a
complete and state-independent change in the dynamic is sickle-cell anemia [1, 2]. Being a carrier for
sickle-cell lowers an individual’s fitness, however, during malaria outbreaks, since sickle-cell carriers have
immunity, which increases their fitness. The random event of malaria outbreaks may be described as a
continuous-time Markov chain that is independent of the population dynamic, yet changes the population
dynamic.
Antibiotics affecting microbial populations is another example of a population subjected to an inde-
pendent stochastic environment [4]. The authors discuss the affects of antibiotics to bacteria, such as
Escherichia coli and Salmonella enterica, and what persistent environment is needed to support the type
that is antibiotic resistant.
Although the motivation for our model is mostly biological, there is also a relationship with economics.
A commonly used tool in economics is Markovian switching [14, 5, 19, 6]. This includes modeling business
cycles and GDP growth, electricity spot price models, and interest rates, all of which are agents working
in a stochastic environment.
Kussell and Leibler [23] model the phenomenon of when bacteria change their phenotype to adjust to
the stochastic environment. The authors assume there are n-phenotypes and linear growth where the fitness
and switch to another phenotype is contingent on the current state of the environment. The stochastic
environment is modeled by a k atom state continuous time Markov process, and is independent of the
evolution of the population. In a current state, if a certain phenotype’s fitness is comparatively small, this
increases the probability of phenotype switching. The authors then derive the optimal long-term growth
rate.
Markovian switching has also been applied to Lotka-Volterra and epidemiological population dynamics
[13, 29]. Gray et al [13] assumed a deterministic susceptible-infected-susceptible model and changed pa-
rameters according to a continuous Markov chain. The author discovered that the parameters coupled with
the unique invariant measure of the Markov chain gave essentially new rates and found similar inequali-
ties for either an endemic to occur or for the disease to become negligible. Takeuchi et al [29] analyzed
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the switching between two deterministic Lotka-Volterra models and showed that this system is neither
permanent nor dissipative.
Fudenberg and L. A. Imhof [10] applied a simpler method where the event that switches the fitness of a
population modeled by a Moran process was independent and identically distributed. The authors assumed
a two state switched system, considered the mean of the fitness, and compared the switched fitnesses to
derive their results.
Considering both a discrete Moran and a deterministic continuous time replicator dynamic, Harper et
al [15] applied a method similar to of Fudenberg and L. A. Imhof to determine whether the mean game of
the switched system was either a strategy 1 dominant (prisoner’s dilemma), strategy 2 dominant (prisoner’s
dilemma), coordination game, or mixed strategy dominant (hawk-dove). For the continuous time replicator
dynamic, the authors determined this classification by comparing the ratios of the difference between the
payoffs of the two underlying games and the ratio of whether the event will occur or not. These results are
different than the ones derived in this paper.
We analyze a Markovian switched stochastic replicator dynamic with two strategies and determine
conditions for this “new” game to be classified in one of the four games mentioned in the previous paragraph.
The times between jumps to another state for the continuous time Markov chain is assumed to have an
exponential distribution. Since the switched systems are stochastic, the classifications are similar to the
ones given by Fudenberg and Harris [9], in that the inequality of a payoff of pure strategy against itself
and the other strategy are perturbed by half the difference of the variances (perturbation from the white
noise), and the comparison of the transition from a fixed state to the other states (perturbation from the
Markov chain). Since the switching indirectly perturbs the dynamic, appropriately determined constants
(that are not unique) are associated to a particular state. The difference between the constant of the fixed
state and another state, multiplied by this transition rate, compare this transition. The sum of these terms
encompasses the entire transition comparison for this state. For example, if the dynamic switches between
two states where the transition rates are equal, then the addition/subtraction of an appropriately sized
constant to the inequalities derived by Fudenberg and Harris [9] determine the proper inequalities for the
dynamic.
To help create intuition, we first consider a Markov chain in a two atom state space, then extend
the analogous results to the general finite atom state space. To illustrate the conditions for the long-run
behavior, we give an example of cooperation in a stochastic environment where defection is punished in
one environment, and not punished in the other. The efficacy of punishment is then explored.
2 Stochastic Replicator Dynamic
Consider a two-player symmetric game, where aij is the payoff to a player using pure strategy Si against
an opponent employing strategy Sj , and take A = (aij) as the payoff matrix. Within a population we
assume that every individual is programmed to play a pure strategy. For i = 1, 2, let pi(t) be the size of the
subpopulation that plays strategy Si at time t, which we denote as the i
th subpopulation. Furthermore,
define p(t) := (p1(t), p2(t))
T , P (t) := p1(t) + p2(t), and s(t) := (s1(t), s2(t))
T where si(t) := pi(t)/P (t)(
the frequency of the ith subpopulation
)
. When a player in the ith subpopulation is randomly matched
with another player from the entire population,
(
As(t)
)
i
is the average payoff for this individual, which we
take to be the fitness of the player. We assume growth is proportional to fitness:
p˙i(t) = pi(t)
(
As(t)
)
i
,
and hence
s˙i(t) = si(t)
((
As(t)
)
i
− s(t)TAs(t)
)
.
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This is the replicator dynamic. For uniformity of notation, we consider the payoff matrix A =
(
a b
c d
)
.
Simplifying the dynamic above, we have
s˙1(t) = s1(t)s2(t)
[(
a− c
)
s1(t) +
(
b− d
)
s2(t)
]
s˙2(t) = s1(t)s2(t)
[(
c− a
)
s1(t) +
(
d− b
)
s2(t)
]
.
Since s2(t) = 1− s1(t) (see [7]), we may focus on the dynamic of s˙1(t) = s1(t)
(
1 − s1(t)
)[
− b+ d +
(
a−
c+ d− b
)
s1(t)
]
. In this dynamic, if:
1. a > c and d < b then S1 is the only dominant strategy (strategy 1 dominant), (1, 0) is stable and
(0, 1) is unstable;
2. a < c and d > b then S2 is the only dominant strategy (strategy 2 dominant), (1, 0) is unstable and
(0, 1) is stable;
3. a > c and d > b then S1 and S2 are the only dominant strategies where (1, 0) and (0, 1) are stable,
and convergence to either point is contingent on the initial condition (coordination game);
4. and a < c and d < b then
(
a− c
a− c+ d− b
,
d− b
a− c+ d− c
)
is the only evolutionary stable strategy
(mixed strategy dominant).
In this paper we give conditions that correspond to one of the games listed above. We now describe the
stochastic replicator dynamic and discuss the analogous characterizations.
Throughout this paper, we have the complete probability space (Ω,F , P ), with the filtration {Ft}t∈R+ ,
where F0 contains all of the null sets of F , and the filtration is right-continuous. Fudenberg and Harris [9]
consider a continuous time stochastic replicator dynamic by first assuming
dpi(t) = pi(t)
((
As(t)
)
i
dt+ σidWi(t)
)
,
for σi ∈ R+ and Wi(t) a pairwise independent standard Wiener processes. For i = 1, 2 and j = 3− i, Itoˆ’s
lemma yields
dsi(t) = si(t)sj(t)
[((
As(t)
)
i
−
(
As(t)
)
j
)
dt+
(
σ2j sj(t)− σ
2
i si(t)
)
dt+
(
σidWi(t)− σjdWj(t)
)]
.
This is known as the stochastic replicator dynamic. The idea behind this model is that randomness
comes from the aggregate shock, or population level interactions, that affects the fitness of each type. The
only stationary points for this dynamic are the vertices of the simplex.
Keeping the payoff matrix as A =
(
a b
c d
)
, we have the dynamic
ds1(t) = s1(t)s2(t)
[(
a− c
)
s1(t) +
(
b− d
)
s2(t) + σ
2
2s2(t)− σ
2
1s1(t)
]
dt+ s1(t)s2(t)σdW (t)
ds2(t) = s1(t)s2(t)
[(
c− a
)
s1(t) +
(
d− b
)
s2(t) + σ
2
1s1(t)− σ
2
1s2(t)
]
dt− s1(t)s2(t)σdW (t),
where W (t) is a standard Brownian motion, and σ =
√
σ21 + σ
2
2.
Remark 2.1. For 0 < x < 1, Px
(
s(t) ∈ (0, 1)
)
= 1 for all finite t. See [18] for further information.
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Since s2(t) = 1− s1(t), we may focus on the dynamic
ds1(t) = s1(t)
(
1− s1(t)
)[(
− b+ d+ σ22
)
+
(
a− c− σ21 + d− b− σ
2
2
)
s1(t)
]
dt+ s1(t)
(
1− s1(t)
)
σdW (t).
(1)
For simplicity we write s(t) instead of s1(t). Fudenberg and Harris [9] assumed the same inequalities of
the payoffs as above and derived the following proposition to determine the conditions for the stability of
the process.
Proposition 2.1 (Fudenberg and Harris [9]). For the dynamic given by Equation (1), and initial condition
0 < x0 < 1, we have that
1. (Strategy 1 Dominant) If a− c >
(
σ21 − σ
2
2
)
/2 and d− b <
(
σ22 − σ
2
1
)
/2 then s(t)→ 1 as t→∞ a.s.
2. (Strategy 2 Dominant) If a− c <
(
σ21 − σ
2
2
)
/2 and d− b >
(
σ22 − σ
2
1
)
/2, we have s(t)→ 0 as t→∞
a.s.
3. (Coordination) If a−c >
(
σ21−σ
2
2
)
/2 and d−b >
(
σ22−σ
2
1
)
/2 then s(t)→ 1 as t→∞ with probability
I1(x0)
I1(x0)+I2(x0)
and s(t)→ 0 as t→∞ with probability I2(x0)
I1(x0)+I2(x0)
. (For the exact values of I1(x0) and
I2(x0), see [9])
4. (Mixed Strategy Dominant) If a− c <
(
σ21 − σ
2
2
)
/2 and d− b <
(
σ22 − σ
2
1
)
/2 then Px0
(
lim inf
t→∞
s(t) =
0
)
= Px0
(
lim sup
t→∞
s(t) = 1
)
= 1. In fact, the process is positive recurrent with a unique invariant
measure.
In this model there is a possibility that the variances will trump an evolutionary stable strategy, e.g.,
c < a < c+
σ21 − σ
2
2
2
, or change a dominated pure strategy dominant, e.g., b > d > b+
σ22 − σ
2
1
2
.
Throughout this paper, the “stochastic” classifications in Proposition 2.1 will be the reasoning for a
vertex being either stable or unstable. We now ready to define the switched dynamic.
3 Markovian Switching
Let r(t) be a continuous time Markov chain with the state space {1, 2} and generator Q =
(
−q12 q12
q21 −q21
)
,
where q12 > 0 is a transition rate from state 1 to state 2, and q21 > 0 is a transition rate from state 2 to
state 1. So for δ > 0, P
(
r(t+ δ) = 2
∣∣∣r(t) = 1) = q12δ + o(δ) and P(r(t+ δ) = 1∣∣∣r(t) = 2) = q21δ + o(δ).
Given an increasing sequence of times that the process jumps states (note these are stopping times), say
0 = τ0 < τ1 < . . . < τk →∞, r(t) may be written as
r(t) =
∞∑
k=0
r(τk)I[τk,τk+1)(t).
Given that r(τk) = i, the times between jumps are exponentially distributed with parameter qij, with
j = 3 − i. Hence, for any T ≥ 0, P
(
τk+1 − τk ≥ T
∣∣∣r(τk) = 1) = e−q12T , and similarly for the initial
condition r(τk) = 2. Finally, this Markov chain has a unique stationary distribution Π =
(
π1, π2
)
, where
π1 =
q21
q12 + q21
and π2 =
q12
q12 + q21
. For further information, see Anderson [3].
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For two stochastic replicator dynamics, define the payoff matrices A1 =
(
a1 b1
c1 d1
)
, and A2 =(
a2 b2
c2 d2
)
, and the corresponding diffusion coefficients σ11 and σ21, and σ12 and σ22. Assuming that
r(t) is independent of the Brownian perturbation, we consider the replicator dynamic with Markovian
switching given by
dY
(
s(t), r(t)
)
:= s(t)
(
1− s(t)
)[(
− dr(t) + br(t) + σ
2
2r(t)
)
+
(
ar(t) − cr(t) − σ
2
1r(t) + dr(t) − br(t) − σ
2
2r(t)
)
s(t)
]
dt
+ s(t)
(
1− s(t)
)√
σ21r(t) + σ
2
2r(t)dW (t)
:= s(t)
(
1− s(t)
)[
−Br(t) +
(
Ar(t) +Br(t)
)
s(t)
]
dt+ s(t)
(
1− s(t)
)
σr(t)dW (t),
(2)
where Br(t) := dr(t) − br(t) − σ
2
2r(t), Ar(t) := ar(t) − cr(t) − σ
2
1r(t), and σr(t) :=
√
σ21r(t) + σ
2
2r(t). To simplify
the notation, we set S(t) = Y
(
s(t), r(t)
)
.
For L the infinitesimal operator, and V (x, i) ∈ [0, 1] × {1, 2}, where for i = 1, 2, and j := 3 − i, V (·, i)
is twice continuously differentiable, we have
LV (x, i) = x
(
1− x
)[
−Bi +
(
Ai +Bi
)
x
]
V ′(x, i) +
σ2i
2
x2(1− x)2V ′′(x, i)
+ qijV (x, j) − qijV (x, i).
For more information, see page 48 in [24], and page 103 in [28].
We now define the notation of stochastic stability that will be used throughout this paper. Although
very similar to the definitions given in Khasminskii [20], they are very natural to the switched dynamic.
We follow [21, 24], and note that the definition is given for the point x = 0 and for a process evolving
on the unit interval, but has a natural extension to x = 1. Although we first consider the case when
r(t) is in a two atom state, we give the definition for a general finite n atom state space, which we call
I := {1, 2, . . . , n}.
We define Px,i as the probability measure corresponding to S(t) when s(0) = x and r(0) = i, almost
surely. Throughout this paper, the initial conditions are assumed to almost surely hold.
Definition 3.1. The stationary point x = 0 is said to be:
1. stable in probability if, for any ǫ > 0 and i ∈ I,
lim
x→0
Px,i
(
sup
t≥0
S(t) > ǫ
)
= 0;
2. asymptotically stable in probability if it is stable in probability and for any i ∈ I,
lim
x→0
Px,i
(
lim
t→∞
S(t) = 0
)
= 1
We now define the possible properties that the dynamic will hold. The definitions are given for a
process evolving in the unit interval, and are the adjusted definitions for a process on the real line. Please
see [24] for the general definitions.
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Definition 3.2. For each of the following definitions, take the pair (x, i) as the initial condition.
1. A Markov process S(t) is said to be regular if for any finite time T > 0,
Px,i
(
sup
0≤t≤T
S(t) = 0 or 1
)
= 0
2. For U := D × J , where D ( [0, 1] nonempty and J ⊂ I, and τU := inf
{
t ≥ 0 : S(t) ∈ U
}
, a Markov
process S(t) is called recurrent with respect to U if it is regular and for any finite time T > 0,
Px,i
(
τU <∞
)
= 1,
where (x, i) is an arbitrary initial condition in Dc × I. (The notation Dc means the complement of the
set D.)
3. If S(t) is not recurrent, it is called transient.
4. The process is called positive recurrent with respect to the set U if it is recurrent and D ⊂ (ω0, ω1),
where 0 < ω0 < ω1 < 1.
In this paper we apply the stochastic Lyapunov method to derive the stability or instability of each
vertex, and characterize long-run behavior of the dynamic by combining the stability or instability property
for each vertex and utilizing these properties. Similar to the deterministic Lyapunov method, the stochastic
Lyapunov method transforms the process so that it is a positive valued supermartingale (defined below),
which implies that the process is decreasing.
Definition 3.3. For 0 ≤ s ≤ t and a Markov process X, define E
[
X(t)
∣∣σ{X(s0) : s0 ≤ s}] as the
conditional expectation of the process at time t dependent on the history of the process up to time s,
(where σ{X(s0) : s0 ≤ s} is the σ-algebra of the process up to time s). We call X martingale if
E
[
X(t)
∣∣σ{X(s0) : s0 ≤ s}] = X(s), a submartingale if E[X(t)∣∣σ{X(s0) : s0 ≤ s}] ≥ X(s), and a
supermartingale if E
[
X(t)
∣∣σ{X(s0) : s0 ≤ s}] ≤ X(s).
4 Analysis of the Model
Before we begin our analysis, we show an important characteristic of Equation (2). Given any strict
subinterval of the unit interval, S(t) leaves this interval in finite time. Since each process of the switched
dynamic has this property, the result is very natural. However, one may wonder if the switching could
keep a significant number of sample paths within this interval. When reading the proof, notice that it does
not depend on the size of the state space of r(t), but that the state space has a finite number of atoms.
Proposition 4.1. For (x0, x1) ⊂ (ω0, ω1), where 0 < ω0 < ω1 < 1, x ∈ (x0, x1), and τ defined to be the
time S(t) leaves this interval, we have Ex,i
[
τ
]
<∞.
Proof. Define the positive function V (x, i) = eγ − eγx, where γ > 0. Notice that V (x, i) does not depend
on i. For any i, we see that
LV (x, i) = −γeγxx(1− x)
[
−Bi +
(
Ai +Bi
)
x
]
− γ2eγx
σ2i
2
x2(1− x)2
= −γeγxx(1− x)
{
−Bi +
(
Ai +Bi
)
x+ γ
σ2i
2
x(1− x)
}
.
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We now choose γ large enough so that −Bi +
(
Ai + Bi
)
x + γ
σ2i
2
x(1 − x) > 0 for all x ∈ (x0, x1), and
i ∈ {1, 2}. Thus, there exists a constant K > 0, such that LV (x, i) ≤ −K for any i. Dynkin’s formula
yields
0 ≤ Ex,i
[
V
(
τ ∧ t
)]
= V (x, i) + Ex,i
[ ∫ τ∧t
0
LV
(
S(u)
)
du
]
≤ V (x, i) −KEx,i
[
τ ∧ t
]
,
which implies that Ex,i
[
τ ∧ t
]
≤ V (x, i)/K. Taking t → ∞, the monotone convergence theorem tells us
that that Ex,i
[
τ
]
<∞.
Borrowing and adjusting the Lyapunov function defined in [21, 32], we give conditions for 0 and 1 to
be stochastically stable or unstable. Take 0 < α < 1, and constants c1 and c2. These constants are not
unique and will be taken accordingly in order establish stability or instability of a particular vertex. Define
the four positive Lyapunov functions as V ±0 (x, i) =
(
1∓αci
)
x±α, and V ±1 (x, i) =
(
1±αci
)(
1−x
)±α
. Note
that for each i, lim
xց0
V +0 (x, i) = 0 = lim
xր1
V +1 (x, i), and lim
xց0
V −0 (x, i) = ∞ = lim
xր1
V −1 (x, i). These limits in
conjunction with the conditions for the dynamic to be a supermartingale will tell us whether our process is
stable or unstable for the respective vertex. Conditions for the dynamic to be a supermartingale are given
below.
Applying the infinitesimal generator to each function, for i = 1, 2, and take j := 3− i, we have
LV +0 (x, i) = α
(
1− αci
)
xα
{(
1− x
)[
−Bi + (Ai +Bi)x
]
+
α− 1
2
σ2i (1− x)
2 + qij
ci − cj
1− αci
}
,
LV −0 (x, i) = −α
(
1 + αci
)
x−α
{(
1− x
)[
−Bi + (Ai +Bi)x
]
+
−α− 1
2
σ2i (1− x)
2 + qij
ci − cj
1 + αci
}
,
LV +1 (x, i) = −α
(
1 + αci
)(
1− x
)α{
x
[
−Bi + (Ai +Bi)x
]
+
−α+ 1
2
σ2i x
2 + qij
ci − cj
1 + αci
}
,
and
LV −1 (x, i) = α
(
1− αci
)(
1− x
)−α{
x
[
−Bi + (Ai +Bi)x
]
+
α+ 1
2
σ2i x
2 + qij
ci − cj
1 + αci
}
.
If there exist a neighborhood (within the simplex) around 0 or 1 such that LV ±0 (x, i) ≤ 0 or LV
±
1 (x, i) ≤ 0
for x in the respective neighborhoods, then V
(
S(t)
)
is a supermartingale in these neighborhoods. To
accomplish this goal, we find conditions for the functions defined in the curly brackets above to be the
appropriate sign at either x = 0 or x = 1. Plugging in x = 0 or x = 1 as appropriate yields the following
assumptions:
Assumption 4.1. Assume there exists 0 < α < 1, c1, and c2, where one of the following inequalities holds
for each i = 1, 2, and j := 3− i:
(i) 1− αci > 0 and −Bi +
α−1
2 σ
2
i + qij
ci−cj
1−αci
< 0;
(ii) 1 + αci > 0 and −Bi +
−α−1
2 σ
2
i + qij
ci−cj
1+αci
> 0;
(iii) 1 + αci > 0 and Ai +
−α+1
2 σ
2
i + qij
ci−cj
1+αci
> 0;
(iv) 1− αci > 0 and Ai +
α+1
2 σ
2
i + qij
ci−cj
1−αci
< 0.
Notice that these assumptions are an extension to the inequalities derived by Fudenberg and Harris [9].
Furthermore, note that the term
|α|
2
σ2i is negligible.
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In order to utilize the assumptions to prove stability/instability properties of the switched replicator
dynamic for each vertex, for any sufficiently small ǫ and δ, any initial condition ǫ < x < δ and i ∈ {1, 2},
or 1− δ < x < 1− ǫ and i ∈ {1, 2}, the exit time out of the interval (ǫ, δ), or (1− δ, 1− ǫ), has to be almost
surely finite. Proposition 4.1 gives us this characteristic.
We are now ready to state a theorem about the stability or instability of the vertices. The argument
is very similar to the proofs in Theorems 5.3.1, 5.4.1, and 5.4.2 in [20]. Since the proofs of these theorems
only utilize the assumptions of the Markov process being continuous and the ability to apply the strong
Markov property, one may see that there is natural extension to our theorem. For brevity, we omit the
proof.
Theorem 4.1. For the dynamic defined by Equation (2), if:
(1) Assumption 4.1(i) holds, then x = 0 is asymptotically stable in probability;
(2) Assumption 4.1(ii) holds, then x = 0 is unstable in probability;
(3) Assumption 4.1(iii) holds, then x = 1 is asymptotically stable in probability;
(4) Assumption 4.1(iv) holds, then x = 1 is unstable in probability.
Taking the conditions in Theorem 4.1 we establish the long-run behavior of the switched stochastic
replicator dynamic. For example, if Assumption 4.1(i) (the point 0 is asymptotically stable) and Assump-
tion 4.1(iv) (the point 1 is unstable) hold then the our dynamic will converge to 0 almost surely, which is
the strategy 2 dominant game. This is Proposition 4.2. However, for the transient/recurrent properties to
hold, the dynamic needs to be regular. One may see that this property does holds by Remark 2.1.
Since the process evolves on the unit interval, if the dynamics that are switched all have the same
unstable vertex, then this vertex will also be unstable for the switched dynamic. This can be shown by
setting c1 = c2 for the appropriate V
−
· function. The same reasoning my be applied to a stable vertex.
For the proofs of the following propositions, we define the stopping times: τǫ as the first time the process
leaves the interval (0, ǫ); and τ˜ǫ as the first time the process leaves the interval (1− ǫ, 1). Furthermore, we
assume that the initial conditions lie in (0, 1) × {1, 2}.
Proposition 4.2 (Strategy 2 Dominant). For the dynamic defined by Equation (2), if Assumptions 4.1(i)
and 4.1(iv) hold, then for any initial condition, S(t) converges to 0 almost surely.
Proof. By Assumption 4.1(iv), there exists a δ > 0 such that, for x ∈ (1−δ, 1) and an α > 0, LV (x, i) ≤ −α,
for i ∈ {1, 2}. This tells us that Ex,i[τ˜δ] <∞. Also, by Assumption 4.1(i), there exists an ǫ > 0 such that
for x ∈ (0, ǫ) and i ∈ {1, 2}, we have Px,i
(
lim
t→∞
S(t) = 0
)
> 0.
We now show that the process is transient, which implies that S(t) converges to 0 almost surely. To
accomplish this, we apply Theorem 3 in Myen and Tweedie [26]. Take a constant ǫ0, where 0 < ǫ0 < ǫ,
and for the Lebesgue measureM and A ∈ B
(
(0, 1)
)
, define Φ
(
A
)
=M
(
A∩ (ǫ0, 1− δ)
)
. We have that the
measure Φ is an irreducible measure (see [8, 25, 26] for further information). For x ∈ (ǫ0, ǫ), notice that
Px,i
(
τǫ =∞
)
> 0. Therefore, the assumptions of Theorem 3 hold, and hence our dynamic is transient.
Notice that the above proof utilizes the characteristic of the process near each stationary point to show
almost sure convergence to the point 0. For the case when 0 is unstable and 1 is asymptotically stable,
the argument to show that the dynamic converges to 1 almost sure is identical. This gives us the following
corollary.
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Corollary 4.1 (Strategy 1 Dominant). If Assumptions 4.1(ii) and 4.1(iii) hold, then for any initial con-
dition, S(t) converges to 1 almost surely.
The next proposition shows that when both stationary points are asymptotically stable in probability,
the process is transient and will converge to either endpoint almost surely. Due to the complexity of the
process, given an initial condition, we are unable to derive probabilities of converging to 0 and converging
to 1. When there is no switching between processes, the probabilities are explicit and given in Fudenberg
and Harris [9].
Proposition 4.3 (Coordination Game). For the dynamic defined by Equation (2), if Assumptions 4.1(i)
and 4.1(iii) hold, then S(t) is transient and converges to 0 or 1 almost surely.
Proof. Take an arbitrarily small ǫ > 0. By Assumptions 4.1(i) and 4.1(iii), there exists a δ > 0 such
that Px,i
(
lim
t→∞
S(t) = 0
)
≥ 1 − ǫ for x < δ, or Px,i
(
lim
t→∞
S(t) = 1
)
≥ 1 − ǫ for x > 1 − δ. Define
F =
{
lim
t→∞
S(t) = 1 or 0
}
, and τˆδ as the first time the process leaves the interval (δ, 1 − δ).
Proposition 4.1 tells us that τˆδ has finite mean. Therefore, the strong Markov property yields Px,i
(
F
)
=
Ex,i
[
ES(τˆǫ)[IF ]
]
≥ 1− ǫ. Since ǫ was arbitrary, we are able to conclude the statement.
The proposition below gives conditions for the dynamic to be positive recurrent. For example, if the
dynamic switches between two “stochastic” mixed strategy dominant games, taking c1 = c2 for V
−
0 and
V −1 tells us that the condition holds.
Proposition 4.4 (Mixed Strategy Dominant). For the dynamic defined by Equation (2), if Assumptions
4.1(ii) and 4.1(iv) hold, then S(t) is positive recurrent.
Proof. By Assumption 4.1(iv), there exists a δ > 0 and α1 > 0 such that for any x ∈ (1 − δ, 1) and
i ∈ {1, 2}, we have LV (x, i) ≤ −α1. Thus Ex,i[τ˜δ] < ∞. Moreover, Assumption 4.1(ii) says there exists
an ǫ > 0 and α0 > 0 such that for x ∈ (0, ǫ) and i ∈ {1, 2}, we have LV (x, i) ≤ −α0. Thus Ex,i[τǫ] < ∞.
Therefore, the process hits the set (ǫ, 1 − δ) in finite time. The strong Markov property tells us that the
process is positive recurrent in (ǫ, 1 − δ). Proposition 4.1 yields that the process is positive recurrent for
any strict subinterval of (0, 1).
Remark 4.1. When q12 = q21, whichever process has the “stronger” stability or instability to the particular
vertex will dictate the dynamic. To illustrate this, consider the case when −B1 +
−α− 1
2
σ21 > 0 and
−B2 +
−α− 1
2
σ22 < 0, where α ≪ 1. Since q12 = q21, to show that Assumption 4.1(ii) may hold, we
will subtract a positive constant from the first term, and add the same constant to the second term. If
−B1+
−α− 1
2
σ21 >
∣∣∣−B2+−α− 1
2
σ22
∣∣∣ (which means the process for r(t) = 1 has a “stronger” instability to
x = 0 than the process r(t) = 2 has stability at x = 0), then we may find a k > 0 where −B1+
α− 1
2
σ21−k >
0 and −B2 +
α− 1
2
σ22 + k > 0, which tells us that S(t) is unstable at x = 0.
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5 Example of Defectors
Taylor et al [30] analyzed a prisoner’s dilemma game between cooperators C and defectors D, where
defection was punished. Assuming a payoff b > 0 for cooperation and a cost c > 0, where b > c, the
payoffs are
C D
C b−c −c
D b 0
, leaving the defection strategy the only dominant strategy. When punishment is
taken into account, the payoffs are
C D
C b−c −c
D b−γ2 (b+ c) 0
, where for a large enough γ, this is a coordination
game. We consider the scenario where punishment for defection follows a stochastic environment. Take
the payoff matrices for the two environment as
(
1 −1
2 0
)
and
(
1 −1
.2 0
)
, and the variances values are
σ221 = .1 = σ
2
22, σ
2
11 = .15 = σ
2
12, and σ
2
1 = .5 = σ
2
2 . We call the game without punishment state 1 and the
game with punishment state 2. Since in both states the point (0, 1) (the population defecting) is stable,
this is also true in the switched environment. This is Assumption 4.1(i), which written out is
−.9 + .5
(
α− 1
)
+ q12
c1 − c2
1− αc1
< 0
−.9 + .5
(
α− 1
)
+ q21
c2 − c1
1− αc2
< 0
where 0 < α < 1, 1 − αc1 > 0, and 1 − αc2 > 0. Taking c1 = c2 gives us the inequalities. For the vertex
(1, 0) (population of cooperators) to be stable, one would assume that the transition rate from state 2 to
state 1 is rather small. Hence, if this transition rate is large, (1, 0) would be unstable. The inequalities
needed for (1, 0) to be unstable (Assumption 4.1(vi)) are
−1.15 + .5
(
α+ 1
)
+ q12
c1 − c2
1− αc1
< 0
.65 + .5
(
α+ 1
)
+ q21
c2 − c1
1− αc2
< 0
where, again, 0 < α < 1, 1 − αc1 > 0, and 1 − αc2 > 0. Thus, if q21 > q12 one may be able to find α,
c1, and c2 to make these inequalities hold. However, if q12 > q21 then it might be possible for (1, 0) to be
stable, i.e.,
−1.15 + .5
(
−α+ 1
)
+ q12
c1 − c2
1 + αc1
> 0
.65 + .5
(
−α+ 1
)
+ q21
c2 − c1
1 + αc2
> 0
which is Assumption 4.1(iii). In particular, take q12 = 1 and q21 = 3. Clearly, we should be able to find
constants such that the inequalities in Assumption 4.1(vi) hold. In fact, define α = .001, c1 = −1, and
c2 = −1.5. Then
−1.15 + .5
(
α+ 1
)
+ 1
c1 − c2
1− αc1
= −.9 < 0
.65 + .5
(
α+ 1
)
+ 3
c2 − c1
1− αc2
≈ −6.3382 < 0.
6 Analysis With a Markov Chain with General Finite State Space.
In this section we consider a generalized version of Equation (2), where r(t) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, for some finite
integer n. The analysis for the case when the state space was {1, 2} used only the characteristic of the
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dynamic near the vertices, and not the assumption that r(t) jumps between two atoms. Therefore, we have
analogous results with identical proofs. However, since we have a general finite n state space, we need to
slightly change the assumptions for stability and instability of the vertices.
Take r(t) to be a continuous time Markov chain in state space {1, 2, . . . , n}, for some finite integer n,
with infinitesimal generator Q =


q11 q12 . . . q1n
...
...
. . .
...
qn1 qn2 . . . qnn

 . Recall that, for i 6= j, qij > 0 is the transition
rate from i to j, and qii = −
∑
j 6=i
qij. Furthermore for j 6= i, P
(
r
(
t + δ) = j
∣∣∣r(t) = i) = qijδ + o(δ), and
P
(
τk+1 − τk ≥ T
∣∣∣r(τk) = i) = eqiiT for all T ≥ 0. Just as in the previous sections, we assume that the
Markov chain is independent of the Brownian motion.
We consider the dynamic
dS(t) = s(t)
(
1− s(t)
)[
−Br(t) +
(
Ar(t) +Br(t)
)
s(t)
]
dt+ s(t)
(
1− s(t)
)
σr(t)dW (t), (3)
where r(t) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, and the payoff matrix Ai =
(
ai bi
ci di
)
and variances σ1i, σ2i, and σi :=√
σ21i + σ
2
2i correspond to the state r(t) = i.
For Ln the infinitesimal operator, and V (x, i) ∈ [0, 1] × {1, 2, . . . , n}, where for each i, V (·, i) is twice
continuously differentiable, we have
LnV (x, i) = x
(
1− x
)[
−Bi +
(
Ai +Bi
)
x
]
V ′(x, i) +
σ2i
2
x2(1− x)2V ′′(x, i) +
n∑
j=1
qijV (x, j).
Applying Ln to the same Lyapunov functions as in the previous sections, V
±
0 (x, i) and V
±
1 (x, i), we
derive the following assumptions.
Assumption 6.1. Assume there exists 0 < α < 1, c1, c2, . . ., cn−1, and cn where one of the following
inequalities holds for each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}:
(i) 1− αci > 0 and −Bi +
α− 1
2
σ2i +
n∑
i=1
qij
ci − cj
1− αci
< 0;
(ii) 1 + αci > 0 and −Bi +
−α− 1
2
σ2i +
n∑
i=1
qij
ci − cj
1 + αci
> 0;
(iii) 1 + αci > 0 and Ai +
−α+ 1
2
σ2i +
n∑
i=1
qij
ci − cj
1 + αci
> 0;
(iv) 1− αci > 0 and Ai +
α+ 1
2
σ2i +
n∑
i=1
qij
ci − cj
1− αci
< 0.
We use these assumptions to tell us the stability or instability of the process near the stationary points.
Again, the arguments follow closely the arguments given in Theorems 5.3.1, 5.4.1, and 5.4.2 in [20], and so
we omit the proof.
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Theorem 6.1. For the dynamic defined by Equation (3), if:
(1) Assumption 6.1(i) holds, then 0 is asymptotically stable in probability;
(2) Assumption 6.1(ii) holds, then 0 is unstable in probability;
(3) Assumption 6.1(iii) holds, then 1 is asymptotically stable in probability;
(4) Assumption 6.1(iv) holds, then 1 is unstable in probability.
From this theorem we are able to derive the following propositions. The proof for each proposition
follow the same argument as the analogous proposition in the previous section. For brevity, we merely
state each proposition. Just as in the previous section, if the dynamics that are switched all have the same
unstable vertex, then this vertex will also be unstable for the switched dynamic.This can be shown by
setting c1 = c2 = . . . = cn for the appropriate V
−
· function. The same reasoning my be applied to a stable
vertex.
Just as in the previous section, we take the initial condition to be in (0, 1) × I.
Proposition 6.1 (Strategy 2 Dominant). For the dynamic defined by Equation (3), if Assumptions 6.1(i)
and 6.1(iv) holds, then S(t) converges to 0 almost surely.
Corollary 6.1 (Strategy 1 Dominant). If Assumptions 6.1(ii) and 6.1(iii) holds, then S(t) converges to
0 almost surely.
These conditions state the sample paths of the process tends to veer away from a vertex and evolve to
the stable vertex. The initial condition does not have an influence on the dynamic.
Proposition 6.2 (Coordination). For the dynamic defined by Equation (3), if Assumptions 6.1(i) and
6.1(iii) holds, then S(t) is transient and converges to 0 or 1 almost surely.
The assumptions tell us that both vertices are stable, and as such the initial condition should affect
the probabilities of converging to 0 and converging to 1. However, we are unable to determine these
probabilities.
Proposition 6.3 (Mixed Strategy Dominant). For the dynamic defined by Equation (3), if Assumptions
6.1(ii) and 6.1(iv) holds, then S(t) is positive recurrent in a strict subinterval on (0, 1).
The vertices in these assumptions are unstable and thus we have that the process is recurrent.
7 Conclusions
We considered a new dynamic that consisted of independent switching between the underlying game payoffs
and variances of the stochastic replicator process. Conditions for the switched stochastic replicator dynamic
to be unstable or asymptotically stable for each vertex were derived. The combination of these conditions
helped characterize the long-run behavior of the dynamic. The characterizations are an extension to the
inequalities derived by Fudenberg and Harris [9] that include the difference of the payoffs in a column of
the payoff matrix, half the difference of the variances, and the comparison of a fixed state transitioning
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to all other states. Since the switching indirectly perturbs the dynamic, each state is represented by an
appropriately chosen, but not unique, constant. The difference of the constant for the fixed state and the
constant of another state, multiplied by the transition rate from the fixed state to the other state, is the
way we compare these two states. The sum of these terms is the comparison of the fixed state to all other
states. There is an extra term involving the variance, however, this term is negligible.
Although the proofs focused on the case when the continuous Markov chain is in a two atom state space,
the arguments have a very natural extension to the general finite atom state space. It may be possible to
find better stochastic Lyapunov functions to obtain more precise conditions than the ones derived in this
paper. However, since the inequalities are an extension of the criteria derived by Fudenberg and Harris,
the conditions may be optimal.
Finally, I believe that the assumptions given are exhaustive. Consider this example in a two atom state:
if −B1+
−α− 1
2
σ21 > 0, −B2+
−α− 1
2
σ22 < 0, −B1+
−α− 1
2
σ21 =
∣∣∣−B2+ −α− 1
2
σ22
∣∣∣, −B1+ α− 1
2
σ21 =∣∣∣−B2+ α− 1
2
σ22
∣∣∣, and q12 = q21, then we are unable to saying anything about the dynamic 0. However, the
two equalities imply that
∣∣∣−B2 + −α− 1
2
σ22
∣∣∣ < ∣∣∣−B2 + α− 1
2
σ22
∣∣∣, which is impossible. Similar reasoning
for other cases is how this hypothesis was derived.
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